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A SETTLEMENT IN CRISIS: HOW IN RE OPIOID
LITIGATION FAILS TO PUT PEOPLE BEFORE
CORPORATIONS
Since 1999, 932,000 people in the United States have died from a drug
overdose.1 In 2021 alone over 100,000 people died from a drug overdose.2
Seventy-eight percent of those overdoses involved opioids.3 As the opioid
epidemic has torn families apart and decimated American communities, the
natural response is to find someone to blame. State and local governments,
Native-American tribes, labor unions, insurance companies, hospitals, and
individuals have all pointed the finger at the same culprits: opioid manufacturers
and distributors.4
The result—over 3,000 state and local governments alongside Native
American tribes joined In Re Opiate Litigation, 5 a multidistrict litigation,
alleging “improper marketing of and inappropriate distribution of various
prescription opiate medications into cities, states and towns across the country.”6
On February 25, 2022, five years after these actions were first centralized in the
Northern District of Ohio, the “Big Three” distributors (“the Distributors”)—
McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Cardinal Health—finalized a $21 billion
settlement for their role in the opioid crisis.7 This perspective analyzes the two
main provisions of the opioid settlement—the abatement fund and
Clearinghouse provisions—and compares them to equivalent provisions in the
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (“tobacco settlement”). This
juxtaposition highlights that while the opioid Global Settlement Agreement
(“opioid settlement”) took a cue from the tobacco settlement agreement’s
ineffective abatement fund provisions, the opioid settlement failed to mirror the

1 The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Behind the Numbers, CENTERS DISEASE CONT. & PREVENTION (Jun. 1,
2022), https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/data/index.html.
2 Id.
3 Drug Overdose Deaths in the U.S. Top 100,000 Annually, CENTERS DISEASE CONT. & PREVENTION
(Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2021/20211117.htm
4 Opioids, NAT’Y ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN. (last visited Oct. 2, 2022); See also Roger Michalski, MDL
Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 179 (2019).
5 Id.
6 In Re Nat’y Opiate Litig., 290 F.Supp.3d 1375, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
7 Associated Press, J&J, Distributors Finalize $26B Landmark Opioid Settlement, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2022-02-25/j-j-distributors-finalize26b-landmark-opioid-settlement.
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biggest strength of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: strong, robust
transparency provisions.
Comparing the provisions in the opioid settlement to similar provisions in
prior litigation is useful. Because the “[o]pioid litigation is arguably the most
complicated litigation ever to hit American courts . . . it is sensible to look back
to the second most complex and hotly contested civil action in American history:
tobacco.”8 Comparing the tobacco settlement to the opioid settlement is helpful
because the lingering memory of the tobacco settlement shaped the opioid
settlement,9 and the settlements were structured similarly with both creating
abatement funds and implementing transparency provisions.10
Abatement Funds
The abatement fund provisions in In Re Opioid Litigation show a lesson
learned from the tobacco settlement. The tobacco settlement, despite its
monumental size, is largely regarded as a failure because majority of the $246
billion settlement was not spent on anti-smoking initiatives or remedial
measures.11 The opioid agreement, however, allocates funds to states, counties,
and cities through a formula that accounts for the population of the state and the
number of opioid-related deaths, residents with a substance use disorder, and
opioid pills delivered over the course of the epidemic.12 Unlike the funds in the
tobacco settlement, the funds in the opioid settlement must be used for opioid
remediation.13 If states spend any money for a non-remedial purpose, they are
required to report the amount spent and what the money was used for.14 The
reported information is published for the public to see.15 The Global Settlement

8 Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation: Lessons from
Tobacco and Opioids, 73 STAN. L.REV. 285, 362 (2021) (alteration added) (emphasis in original).
9 See Calleen Walsh, Learning the Hard Way, THE HARV. GAZETTE (Aug. 4, 2021)
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/08/applying-lessons-learned-from-the-tobacco-settlement-toopioid-negotiations/ (noting that the reason that cities and counties were involved in the MDL a direct result of
the mismanagement of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement funds).
10 See generally Walsh, supra note 9; The Master Settlement Agreement, NAT’Y ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN.
(last visited Oct. 23, 2022), https://www.naag.org/our-work/naag-center-for-tobacco-and-public-health/themaster-settlement-agreement/.
11 Walsch, supra note 9.
12 Opioids, NAT’Y ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN. (last visited Oct. 2, 2022) https://perma.cc/VN8H-CX23.
13 See generally Distributor Settlement Agreement (Exhibit E) (Mar. 25, 2022) chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://nationalopioidsettlement.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/Final_Distributor_Settlement_Agreement_3.25.22_Final.pdf (listing core strategies
and approved uses for abatement strategies).
14 Id.
15 Id.
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also includes an enforceability provision.16 If a state does not spend the
settlement funds appropriately, the distributors do not have to pay the state any
more.17 Despite the comparative success of the abatement funds and the large
sum that must be paid by the distributors, the abatement fund alone cannot
guarantee corporate responsibility. 18 Transparency provisions, on the other
hand, can be a tool to establish corporate responsibility in settlements.
Transparency Provisions
A ten-year court order lists the transparency provisions of the Global
Settlement, requiring distributors to (1) create a Controlled Substance
Monitoring Program (“CSMP”) to better prevent diversion of controlled
substances,19 and (2) create “a centralized and independent Clearinghouse to
provide all three distributors and state regulators with aggregated data and
analytics about where drugs are going and how often, eliminating blind spots in
the current systems used by distributors.”20 The Clearinghouse is also
responsible for “develop[ing] uniform reporting recommendations for potential
implementation by state regulators . . . to allow the Injunctive Relief Terms and
state and federal laws in a uniform and consistent manner.”21
Transparency provisions are crucial to the success of the opioid agreement
and public health litigation at large. Transparency provisions alone will not
prevent the next health crisis because the “growth of profits at the expense of
public health, is endemic in pharmaceutical markets.”22 But, litigation
historically acts as a catalyst for public policy.23 It does so by
(1) drawing attention to the problem’s existence; (2) uncovering
otherwise concealed information to establish accountability and clarify
the problem’s original scope and character; and, in so doing, (3)
16

Id. at 34-35.
Id.
18 Lenny Bernstein, McKesson, Nation’s Largest Drug Distributor, to pay $150 million in Fines in Opioid
Settlement, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2017/01/18/mckesson-nations-largest-drug-distributor-to-pay-150-million-in-fines-in-opioidsettlement/. (The McKesson’s settlements with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) are an example of a
cautionary tale. In 2008, McKesson reached a $13.2 million settlement with the DEA after failing to report
suspicious narcotics orders. McKesson “continued to fail to report suspicious orders between 2008 and 2012 and
did not fully implement or follow the monitoring program.” As a result, the company settled with DEA and had
to pay a $150 million fine nine years later).
19 See generally Distribution Settlement Agreement, supra note 15 at Exhibit P.
20 Opioids, NAT’Y ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN. (last visited Oct. 2, 2022) https://perma.cc/VN8H-CX23.
21 Distribution Settlement Agreement supra note 19, at P-33.
22 Liza Vertinsky, Pharmaceutical (Re)capture, 20 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 146, 208 (2021).
23 Freeman et al., supra note 23, at 354 (2021).
17
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affecting public opinion in such a way as to spur private activity and
also make the political action against a powerful industry more
palatable.24

The tobacco settlement demonstrates the power of transparency provisions,
of which it contained two.25 The first transparency provision “compelled
[tobacco] manufacturers to support applications for the dissolution of nearly all
protective orders,” which in effect unsealed discovery and left Big Tobacco
subject to public scrutiny.26 The second transparency provision required each
manufacturer “to maintain, for a dozen years at its own expense, a website in
which all released documents would be posted” and publicly available.27 These
repositories were “an indispensable resource”28 because they revealed “tobacco
companies had known for decades that smoking caused cancer” and still
continued to target young children in their campaigns.29 These documents
showed “a conspiracy intended to defraud the American public” and showed the
path Big Tobacco paved towards a public health crisis.30 As a result, “there is
broad consensus” that the transparency provisions in the tobacco settlement
“succeeded beyond expectations.”31
The tobacco transparency provisions shine a light on the inadequacy of the
opioid settlement equivalent: the Clearinghouse provisions. The opioid
settlement’s transparency provisions do not adequately uncover concealed
information, establish accountability, or clarify the distributor’s involvement in
the opioid crisis. Discovery was not unsealed in the opioid settlement; however,
it is unclear what documents were in discovery that could be unsealed because
Judge Polster, the presiding judge in the MDL, directed attorneys to forgo
discovery and begin settlement discussions at the beginning of the case.32 Still,
the opioid settlement could have included a provision like the provision in the
tobacco settlement requiring the creation of a repository for industry
documents.33
24

Id.
Id. at 344.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Jim Carrier, One Final Look Inside the Archive that Exposed Big Tobacco, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Aug.
26,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/minnesota-tobacco-documentdepository/2021/08/25/cdc1ecfc-050c-11ec-a654-900a78538242_story.html.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Elizabeth W. De Leon, The Opioid Crisis or Climate Change: Which is More Likely to Succeed Under
the Tobacco Litigation Model, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 27, 49 (2021).
33 Freeman et al., supra note 23, at 344.
25
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The absence of such a transparency provision is shocking because “the
importance of publicizing companies’ internal documents is not unique to the
tobacco litigation, as it was also recognized as a sign of success in the mass
asbestos product litigation.”34 The importance of such transparency provisions
has also been recognized in other opioid settlements. Johnson & Johnson35 and
McKinsey were both required to turn over corporate documents that highlighted
their role in the opioid crisis to an independent third party for publicly available,
online publication.36 Instead, the Clearinghouse provisions of the opioid
settlement require the CSMP to create and implement drug diversion efforts,
collect data on those efforts, and report that data to the Clearinghouse. Setting
aside the irony of asking the distributors to effectively govern themselves, the
opioid settlement states “[a]ll data provided to the Clearinghouse shall be
confidential.”37 The Distributors’ information “may not be provided to any other
entity or individual outside those expressly contemplated by the Injunctive
Relief Terms,” and the agreement mainly “contemplates” state governments.38
The Clearinghouse data is not retroactive—it only collects data from the time
that the CSMP is formed and after.39 Furthermore, the data that it does create is
not publicly accessible.40
The transparency provisions in the opioid settlement are undeniably weaker
than those in the tobacco settlement, though they should have been stronger.
Unlike the tobacco industry before the tobacco settlement, the opioid market has
always been heavily regulated.41 Nevertheless, the alphabet soup of government
34

Id.
See Walsh supra note 9.
36 Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, AG’s Office Secures $573 Million Settlement With McKinsey
for ‘Turbocharging’ Opioid Sales and Profiting From the Epidemic, MASS.GOV (Feb. 4, 2021)
https://www.mass.gov/news/ags-office-secures-573-million-settlement-with-mckinsey-for-turbochargingopioid-sales-and-profiting-from-the-epidemic (“McKinsey is required to turn over tens of thousands of internal
documents detailing its work for Purdue Pharma and other opioid companies for public disclosure online.”)
37 Id. at P-36.
38 Id. at P-36.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 335-36 (“[T]he opioid environment is, and has long been, positively littered with laws and
requirements. The pills must be (and have been) approved by the FDA as safe and effective for their intended
use. They must be prescribed by licensed physicians ‘acting in the usual course of . . . professional practice.’
The warning label that accompanies each must be vetted, and any related advertising must be accurate, balanced,
evidence-based, and consistent with FDA-approved prescription information. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) imposes quotas on how many drugs may be distributed and also subjects distributors to
a range of seemingly stringent requirements. Because opioids are Schedule II narcotics, distributors must report
to the Attorney General ‘every sale, delivery or other disposal’ of prescription opioids. These reports-which,
collectively, compose the Automated Reports and Consolidated Ordering System data (ARCOS) data and
amount to a database tracing where every pill came from and where it was sold-are routed to the DEA and
35

16

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 10

agencies regulating opioids and the many statutes and regulations on the books
governing the approval and distribution of narcotics failed to stop an opioid
crisis of epic proportions.42 Some argue this proves government regulation is
ineffective and the free market is the only cure.43 Such an argument, however,
overlooks the fact that the opioid crisis is a case of regulatory capture “by
companies who saw an opportunity to profit from cultivating the business of
pain and growing the market for opioids to treat pain.”44 Because the opioid
industry is particularly vulnerable to the interests of Big Pharma, successful
litigation must create barriers to pharmaceutical influence on legislation and
regulations.45
One such barrier to industry influence is public accountability and private
action, both of which can be shaped by litigation. Consequently, transparency
provisions are significant because they help legislators and the public know who
to blame, sway public opinion, and ignite private action against powerful
industries.46 Releasing information to the public can also lead to “moral and
cultural shifts.”47 Polling has shown that litigation surrounding the crisis has
increased awareness of the opioid epidemic; however, it has not shifted the
public’s perception of addicts’ blameworthiness.48 While the public understands
the outrageous actions of Big Tobacco because the settlements made their
company documents public, we are unable to assign that same level of blame to
the Distributors when discovery is sealed and similar provisions are forgone.49
Without cognizable proof of corporate wrongdoing, the public will continue to
stigmatize addicts as people who played an active role in their addiction, rather
than as victims of corporate greed.50 Without such a “moral and cultural shift[]”
of blame from the individual to the corporation, we lose the public—a key group
who can help hold legislatures accountable and prevent pharmaceutical interests
from recapturing our laws and agencies.51 Perhaps, the most egregious aspect of
the opioid settlement is that it hands over legislative power to the Distributors.

ostensibly permit the agency to ‘track controlled substances from the time they are manufactured until they are
dispensed to consumers’).
42 Id.
43 Vertinsky, supra note 22, at 223.
44 Id. at 159, 208.
45 Id. at 219.
46 Freeman et al., supra note 23, at 254.
47 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Alexandra Lahav, Information for the Common Good in Mass Torts, 70
DEPAUL L. Rev. 345, 356 (2021).
48 De Leon, supra note 32, at 57.
49 See Burch & Lahav, supra note 47, at 356-57.
50 Id.
51 Burch & Lahav, supra note 47, at 356.
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The Distributors work hand-in-glove with the Clearinghouse and Clearinghouse
Advisory Panel “to develop uniform reporting recommendations for potential
implementation by state regulators.”52 The opioid agreement even embraces that
the requirement is intended “to benefit the Injunctive Relief Distributors and the
Settling States.”53
The Clearinghouse provisions should have placed a barrier between the
Distributors and legislators to prevent further regulatory capture. Instead, the
opioid settlement paves the way. While the settlement provisions of In Re Opioid
Litigation are resolved, its provisions, much like those of the Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement, can teach us many valuable lessons. Furthermore, these
lessons are not yet moot as potentially one of the last big opioid settlements has
yet to be finalized.54 CVS Health Corp., Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc., and
Walmart Inc. have agreed to pay more than $12 billion to resolve thousands of
lawsuits alleging mishandling of opioids.55 These plaintiffs ought to demand
transparency provisions that require strong separation between legislators and
the Distributors, unseal discovery documents, and actively increase corporate
accountability.
GABRIELLE HUNTER

52

NAT’Y ASSOC. OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 12, at P-32.
Id.
54 Jeff Feely et al., CVS, Walgreens and Walmart Agree to Pay $12 Billion To Settle Opioid Epidemic
Lawsuits, FORTUNE (Nov. 2, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/11/02/cvs-health-agrees-to-pay-5-billion-to-settleopioid-lawsuits%EF%BF%BC/amp/.
55 Id.
53

